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Abstract—This paper characterizes the secret message capacity
of three networks where two unicast sessions share some of
the communication resources. Each network consists of erasure
channels with state feedback. A passive eavesdropper is assumed
to wiretap any one of the links. The capacity achieving schemes as
well as the outer bounds are formulated as linear programs. The
proposed strategies are then numerically evaluated and shown to
achieve higher rate performances (up to a double single- or sum-
rate) with respect to alternative strategies, where the network
resources are time-shared among the two sessions. These results
represent a step towards the secure capacity characterization for
general networks. They also show that, even in configurations
for which network coding does not offer benefits in absence of
security, it can become beneficial under security constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding has well established the benefits
of network coding for secure multicast transmission. We are
here interested in a different type of traffic where we have
two independent unicast sessions and we seek to answer the
following question: what are the benefits that ‘network coding’
type operations offer?
We consider the three networks in Fig. 1, namely the Y-
network, the Reverse Y (RY)-network and the X-network. In
the Y-network two sources (able to generate randomness at
infinite rate) wish to communicate two independent messages
to a common destination, via an intermediate node (unable to
generate randomness). In the RY-network one source (able to
generate randomness at finite rate) aims to communicate two
independent messages to two different receivers, through an
intermediate node (unable to generate randomness). Finally,
in the X-network two sources (able to generate randomness
at infinite rate) seek to communicate two independent mes-
sages to two different receivers, via two intermediate nodes
(unable to generate randomness). In our network model, the
transmissions take place over orthogonal erasure channels;
although this being a simplistic assumption, yet it captures
some intrinsic properties of the wireless medium (such as its
lossy nature). A passive eavesdropper wiretaps any one of the
communication links, but the information about which one
is not available1. Public feedback, which in [1] was shown
to increase the secrecy capacity, is used, i.e., each of the
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1This assumption is equivalent to have one eavesdropper on every link, but
these eavesdroppers do not cooperate among themselves.
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Fig. 1: The Y-network in (a), the RY-network in (b) and the
X-network in (c).
legitimate nodes involved in the communication sends an
acknowledgment after each transmission; this is received by
all nodes in the network as well as by the eavesdropper.
We characterize the secret message capacity for the three
networks in Fig. 1. The capacity-achieving schemes in-
volve two phases: the key-sharing phase and the message-
transmission phase. In particular, first a secret key is created
between two consecutive legitimate nodes (link-by-link key
generation); then, these keys are used to encrypt and transmit
the message like in the one-time pad [2]. For each of the
analyzed networks, the capacity is given as the solution of
a Linear Program (LP). We also show, through numerical
simulations, the benefits of our schemes compared to two
alternative strategies where (a) the two sessions are time-
shared and (b) the shared link is time-shared among the two
sessions. We prove that ‘network coding’ type operations are
beneficial for the three networks in Fig. 1. This is because
random packets transmitted by different sources can be mixed
to create the key to be used on the shared link. Similarly, the
same set of random packets can be used to generate secret
keys for different destinations. This result is surprising since,
in absence of security considerations, network coding is not
beneficial for the networks in Fig. 1.
Related Work. The characterization of the secret capacity for
wireless networks is a long-standing open problem. Relevant
work includes [3], where the author derived the secret message
capacity of the wiretap channel without feedback, and [4],
where it was shown that secure network coding is optimal for
wireless networks with error-free and unit capacity channels.
The work presented in this paper follows a line of research
which was pioneered by the authors in [5], where the secret
capacity of the point-to-point channel was characterized and
expressed as the solution of an LP. In particular, the capacity-
achieving scheme proposed by the authors consists of two
phases, namely the key-sharing and the message-transmission
phases. The same authors extended this approach to char-
acterize the secret capacity of more complex networks, for
example: (i) the parallel channel network where a source
seeks to securely communicate a message to a destination
through a number of independent parallel channels [6], and
(ii) the V-network where two sources, which share a common
randomness, aim to convey the same message to a common
destination [6]. By using a similar approach, in [7] the authors
derived the secret message capacity of the line network when
the eavesdropper wiretaps one channel as well as all the
channels. Recently, in [8] the authors considered a general
network and designed two polynomial-time secure transmis-
sion schemes. Although the two schemes were not proven to
be capacity-achieving, the work in [8] represents an attempt
to characterize the secrecy capacity of an arbitrary network.
Contrary to all these works, where a single unicast session was
considered, here we study the case where two unicast sessions
take place simultaneously and share part of the resources.
Paper Organization. Section II describes the three networks
of interest, namely the Y-, the RY- and the X-network. Sec-
tion III presents our main results, i.e., it characterizes the secret
message capacity and it presents comparisons with alternative
strategies. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
Notation. With [n1 : n2] we denote the set of integers from
n1 to n2 ≥ n1. For an index set A we let YA = {Yj : j ∈ A};
A\B is the set of elements that belong to A but not to B. Y i
is a vector of length i with components (Y1, . . . , Yi).
We consider the three networks in Fig. 1, namely (i) the
Y-network in Fig. 1(a) where two sources S1 and S2 aim to
communicate two independent messages W1 and W2 to a com-
mon destination D; (ii) the RY-network in Fig. 1(b) where one
source S has a message W1 for destination D1 and a message
W2 for destination D2; both in the Y- and in the RY-network
the communication occurs through an intermediate/relay node
M; finally, we study (iii) the X-network in Fig. 1(c) where
two sources S1 and S2 seek to communicate two independent
messages W1 and W2 to two different destinations D1 and D2
via two intermediate nodes M1 and M2.
Each communication link is an independent erasure chan-
nel with one legitimate receiver and one possible passive
eavesdropper. In each network, the eavesdropper wiretaps
one channel, which one exactly is not known. The erasure
probabilities are denoted as δj and δjE, with j ∈ [1 : 3] for
the Y- and the RY-network and j ∈ [1 : 5] for the X-network2.
The j-th channel input at time instant i, with i ∈ [1 : n]
(where n is the total number of transmissions), is denoted
as Xji ∈ F
L
q and referred to as a packet. Without loss of
generality, in what follows we let L log (q) = 1, i.e., we
express the rate in terms of packets. Similarly, Yji and Zji
2Index j enumerates the channel, e.g., for the RY-network in Fig. 1(b) the
channels from S to M, from M to D1 and from M to D2 are referred to as
channels 3, 1 and 2, respectively.
denote the outputs at the legitimate receiver and at the passive
eavesdropper, respectively, on channel j at time i.
For the three scenarios in Fig. 1 we assume public state
feedback, i.e., each legitimate node sends an acknowledgment
whether the packet transmission was successful, which is
received by all other nodes as well as by the eavesdropper. We
denote with Fji the feedback of the transmission on channel
j at time i. For the X-network in Fig. 1(c) we have3
Pr
{
Y[1:5]i, Z[1:5]i |X[1:5]i
}
=
5∏
j=1
Pr {Yji |Xji}Pr {Zji |Xji},
Pr {Yji |Xji} =
{
1− δj , Yji = Xji
δj , Yji = ⊥
,
Pr {Zji |Xji} =
{
1− δjE, Zji = Xji
δjE, Zji = ⊥
,
where with ⊥ we denote the symbol of erasure.
We assume that the intermediate nodes are unable to gen-
erate private randomness4. For the Y- and the X-network the
sources S1 and S2 can generate private randomness Θ1 and Θ2
at infinite rate. Differently, for the RY-network the source S can
generate private randomness at a finite rate D0. The messages
W1 and W2 consist of N1 and N2 packets, respectively, and
have to be reliably and securely decoded at the legitimate
receiver.
Definition 1. For the X-network in Fig. 1(c) a secure coding
scheme with parameters (N1, N2, n, ǫ) consists of 5 encoding
functions fji, j ∈ [1 : 5] for each i ∈ [1 : n] such that
Xji =


fji
(
Wj ,Θj, F
i−1
A
)
if j ∈ [1 : 2]
fji
(
Y i−11 , Y
i−1
2 , F
i−1
A
)
if j = 3
fji
(
Y i−13 , F
i−1
A
)
if j ∈ [4 : 5]
,
where A = [1 : 5], and of 2 decoding functions φj such
that Dj , j ∈ [1 : 2], can decode the message Wj with
high probability, i.e., Pr
{
φj
(
Y nj+3
)
6= Wj
}
< ǫ. Moreover,
the messages W1 and W2 have to remain secret from the
eavesdropper, i.e., I (W1,W2;Znk , FnA) < ǫ, ∀k ∈ [1 : 5]. A
non-negative rate pair (R1, R2) is securely achievable if, for
any ǫ > 0, there exists a secure coding scheme with parameters
(N1, N2, n, ǫ) such that Rj < 1nNj − ǫ, ∀j ∈ [1 : 2].
The main contribution of this paper is the characterization
of the secret message capacity region (the largest securely
achievable rate pair (R1, R2)) for the three networks in Fig. 1
as described in the next three theorems.
Theorem 1. The secret message capacity region of the Y-
network in Fig. 1(a) with unlimited private randomness at the
sources S1 and S2 and no private randomness at the relay
3Although definitions are given only for the X-network, they straightfor-
wardly extend to the Y- and the RY-network.
4 The results here presented readily extend to the case when intermediate
nodes can generate private randomness at finite rate. If intermediate nodes can
generate randomness at infinite rate a naive link-by-link time sharing strategy
would be capacity-achieving.
node M, is the feasible region of the following LP,
max g(R1, R2)
s.t. kj ≥ Rj
1−δjE
1−δjδjE
, j ∈ [1 : 2]
k3 ≥ (R1 + R2)
1−δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
Rj
1−δj
+
kj
(1−δj)δjE
≤ 1, j ∈ [1 : 2]
R1+R2
1−δ3
+ k3(1−δ3)δ3E ≤ 1
k3 ≤
(
k1
δ1E
+ k2
δ2E
)
(1−δ3)δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
Ri, kj ≥ 0, i ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [1 : 3],
where g(R1, R2) can be any linear function of (R1, R2).
Theorem 2. The secret message capacity region of the RY-
network in Fig. 1(b) with limited private randomness of rate
D0 at the source S and no private randomness at the relay
node M, is the feasible region of the following LP,
max g(R1, R2)
s.t. k3 + e
(1−δ3)δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
≥ (R1 +R2)
1−δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
kj ≥ Rj
1−δjE
1−δjδjE
, j ∈ [1 : 2]
R1+R2
1−δ3
+ k3(1−δ3)δ3E +
e
1−δ3
≤ 1
Rj
1−δj
+
kj
(1−δj)δjE
≤ 1, j ∈ [1 : 2]
k3 ≤ (D0 − e)
(1−δ3)δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
kj ≤ (e+
k3
δ3E
)
(1−δj)δjE
1−δjδjE
, j ∈ [1 : 2]
Ri, e, kj ≥ 0, i ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [1 : 3],
where g(R1, R2) can be any linear function of (R1, R2).
Theorem 3. The secret message capacity region of the X-
network in Fig. 1(c) with unlimited private randomness at the
sources S1 and S2 and no private randomness at the relay
nodes M1 and M2, is the feasible region of the following LP,
max g(R1, R2)
s.t. kj ≥ Rj
1−δjE
1−δjδjE
, j ∈ [1 : 2]
k3 + e
(1−δ3)δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
≥ (R1 +R2)
1−δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
kj ≥ Rj−3
1−δjE
1−δjδjE
, j ∈ [4 : 5]
Rj
1−δj
+
kj
(1−δj)δjE
≤ 1, j ∈ [1 : 2]
Rj−3
1−δj
+
kj
(1−δj)δjE
≤ 1, j ∈ [4 : 5]
R1+R2
1−δ3
+ k3(1−δ3)δ3E +
e
1−δ3
≤ 1
k3 ≤ (
k1
δ1E
+ k2
δ2E
− e) (1−δ3)δ3E1−δ3δ3E
kj ≤ (e+
k3
δ3E
)
(1−δj)δjE
1−δjδjE
, j ∈ [4 : 5]
Ri, e, kj ≥ 0, i ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [1 : 5],
where g(R1, R2) can be any linear function of (R1, R2).
III. SECURE CAPACITY CHARACTERIZATION
We here describe the secure coding schemes5 and the outer
bounds and formulate them as LPs. We then show through
numerical evaluations the benefits (in terms of achievable
secure rate) of our scheme with respect to two naive strategies:
(i) path sharing, i.e., the whole communication resources are
5 Schemes consider the expected number of transmissions needed. Similar
to [5], it can be shown that the number of transmissions needed concentrates
exponentially fast around the average enabling to achieve expected rate values.
time-shared among the two sessions and (ii) link sharing, i.e.,
the shared link is time-shared among the two sessions.
A. Achievability
Our secure coding schemes for the networks in Fig. 1 con-
sist of two phases, namely the key-sharing and the message-
transmission. In what follows we describe these two phases
and explain how these relate to the LPs in Theorems 1-3.
1) The Y-network: On channel j ∈ [1 : 2], source Sj
sends kj(1−δj)δjE independent random packets generated from
her private randomness (assumed to be infinite). Out of these,
a total of kj packets are received by the relay node M, but
not by the possible eavesdropper. We do not know exactly
which packets, out of the kj
δjE
ones received by M, are also
received by the possible eavesdropper. However, out of the
packets received by M, we can always create kj independent
packets, which are also independent of the packets received
by the possible eavesdropper. We do this by multiplying the
kj
δjE
packets of M by an MDS code matrix of dimension[
kj
δjE
]
× [kj ]. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume
that we always know which packets are received by the
legitimate node and not by the possible eavesdropper, if we
know their amount [7]. All these packets are used to generate
a secret key on channel j ∈ [1 : 2] between nodes Sj and
M (key-sharing phase). These packets are then expanded by
means of an MDS code matrix of size [kj ]×[Rj ] and used as in
the one-time pad [2] to encrypt Rj message packets, which are
sent using the ARQ protocol (message-transmission phase).
At the intermediate node M (assumed to be unable to
generate any randomness) there are
(
k1
δ1E
)
+
(
k2
δ2E
)
available
random packets (received from S1 and S2 on channels 1 and 2,
respectively). By means of an MDS code these random packets
are first expanded by a factor 11−δ3δ3E and then only
k3
(1−δ3)δ3E
of them are sent to node D. With this, the number of random
packets received by D, but not by the possible eavesdropper
is k3. These random packets are used to generate a secret key
on channel 3 between nodes M and D (key-sharing phase).
Similar to channels 1 and 2, also for channel 3 we expand these
k3 packets by means of an MDS code matrix of dimension
[k3] × [R1 +R2] and then we use them to encrypt R1 + R2
message packets as in the one-time pad [2]. These message
packets are finally transmitted by using the ARQ protocol
(message-transmission phase).
The scheme described above is equivalent to the LP in
Theorem 1, where the variables Ri and kj , with i ∈ [1 : 2] and
j ∈ [1 : 3], represent the message rate for the pair Si −D and
the key created on channel j, respectively. In particular: (i) the
first and second inequalities are security constraints, i.e., they
ensure that the key that is generated is greater than the key
which is consumed6; (ii) the third and fourth inequalities are
time constraints, i.e., the length of the key generation phase
6Since the encrypted packets are sent by using the ARQ protocol, the key
consumed on channel j ∈ [1 : 3] (i.e., the number of packets received by the
possible eavesdropper on that channel) is Rj 1−δjE1−δjδjE , with R3 = R1 +R2.
plus the length of the message sending phase cannot exceed
the total available time; (iii) the fifth inequality follows since
node M has zero randomness and so the key that it can create
is constrained by the randomness received from S1 and S2.
2) The RY-network: In [7], the authors showed that, in a
line network where a node has limited randomness and the
next node can generate randomness based on the one received
from the previous node(s), a combination of ARQ and MDS
coding is needed for optimally generating the key. Following
this, on channel 3 of the RY-network, the source S transmits
e independent random packets using the ARQ protocol. These
packets are all received by the relay node M, while the possible
eavesdropper receives a fraction 1−δ3E1−δ3δ3E of them. By means
of an MDS code, the remaining (D0 − e) random packets at
the source S are expanded by a factor 11−δ3δ3E and then only
k3
(1−δ3)δ3E
of them are sent to node M. Thus, the total number
of packets received by the intermediate node M, but not by
the possible eavesdropper is k3+e (1−δ3)δ3E1−δ3δ3E . Similar to the Y-
network, from the e+ k3
δ3E
independent random packets received
by M, we generate k3 + e (1−δ3)δ3E1−δ3δ3E packets. All these packets
are used to generate a secret key on channel 3 between nodes S
and M (key-sharing phase). They are then expanded by means
of an MDS code matrix of size
[
k3 + e
(1−δ3)δ3E
1−δ3δ3E
]
× [R1 +R2]
and used as in the one-time pad [2] to encrypt R1+R2 message
packets, which are sent using the ARQ protocol (message-
transmission phase).
At the relay node M (assumed unable to generate any
randomness) there are
(
k3
δ3E
+ e
)
available random packets
(received from S on channel 3). By means of an MDS code
these random packets ∀j ∈ [1 : 2] are first expanded by a
factor 11−δjδjE and then only
kj
(1−δj)δjE
of them are sent to node
Dj on channel j. With this, the number of random packets
received by Dj , but not by the possible eavesdropper is kj .
These packets are used to generate a secret key on channel
j between nodes M and Dj (key-sharing phase). These kj
packets are then expanded by means of an MDS code matrix of
dimension [kj ]×[Rj ] and used to encrypt Rj message packets
as in the one-time pad [2]. These message packets are finally
transmitted using ARQ (message-transmission phase).
Similar to the Y-network, also for the RY-network the
secure transmission strategy above is equivalent to the LP in
Theorem 2. The variables Ri, kj and e, with i ∈ [1 : 2] and
j ∈ [1 : 3], represent the message rate for the pair S − Di,
the key created on channel j, and the extra randomness (in
addition to the one sent for generating the key k3) sent from
the source S, respectively. In particular: (i) the first and second
inequalities are security constraints; (ii) the third and the fourth
inequalities are time constraints; (iii) the fifth (respectively,
sixth) inequality is due to the fact that the key that node
S (respectively, M) can create is constrained by its limited
randomness (respectively, the randomness that it gets from S).
3) The X-network: The secure transmission strategy here
proposed for the X-network in Fig. 1(c) consists of a mix
of the two schemes designed for the Y- and the RY-network.
In particular, on channels 1 and 2 we use exactly the same
operations used on channels 1 and 2 of the Y-network, while
on channels 3-5 the same strategy proposed for the RY-network
applies, with the small difference that the available finite
randomness at node S of the RY-network (node M1 in the
X-network) is now replaced by D0 =
(
k1
δ1E
)
+
(
k2
δ2E
)
.
B. Converse
We here highlight the main steps to derive an outer bound on
the secure capacity for the networks in Fig. 1 and to formulate
it as an LP; the complete proof can be found in the Appendix.
Step 1. We prove and make use of the following lemma (see
Appendix A for the details), which is a generalization of those
in [7] for the line network.
Lemma 4. For any j ∈ A, we have
(1− δj) δjE
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,WB, F
n
A\j
)
−
(1− δjE)
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y i−1j , F
i−1
j ;Xji | Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,WB, F
n
A\j
)
= H
(
Y nj | WB, F
n
A, Z
n
j
)
, (1a)
(1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,WB, F
n
A\j
)
= H
(
Y nj | WB, F
n
A
)
, (1b)
n∑
i=1
I
(
WB;Xji | F
n
A\j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j
)
<
ǫ
1− δjE
, (1c)
n∑
i=1
I
(
WB;Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
A\j
)
≥
nRj
1−δjEδj
, (1d)
where: (i) for the Y-network A = [1 : 3], B = {j}, W3 =
W[1:2] and R3 = R1+R2; (ii) for the RY-network A = [1 : 3],
B = [1 : 2] and R3 = R1 + R2; (iii) for the X-network A =
[1 : 5], B = {j}, W3 = W4 = W5 = W[1:2], R3 = R1 + R2,
R4 = R1 and R5 = R2. Moreover, for node D in the Y-
network we have
nR3≤(1−δ3)
n∑
i=1
I
(
W1,W2;X3i | F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3
)
, (1e)
for node Dj , j ∈ [1 : 2] in the RY-network, we have
nRj≤(1−δj)
n∑
i=1
I
(
Wj ;Xji | F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j , F
i−1
j
)
, (1f)
and for node Dj , j ∈ [1 : 2] in the X-network, we have
nRj≤(1−δj+3)
n∑
i=1
I
(
Wj ;Xj+3i |F
n
A\j+3, Y
i−1
j+3 , F
i−1
j+3
)
.
(1g)
Step 2. We use the correspondences between the terms in (2) at
the top of the next page with: (i) A=[1 : 3], κ=3, λ∈ [1 : 2]
and W3 =W[1:2] for the Y-network; (ii) A = [1 : 3], j = 3,
κ ∈ [1 : 2], B = [1 : 2], W3 =W[1:2] and e3 = e for the RY-
network; (iii) A=[1 : 5], j=3, λ∈ [1 : 2], κ∈ [4 : 5], B={j},
W3=W4=W5=W[1:2] and e3=e for the X-network. All the
nkj ↔
δjE(1− δj)
δj(1− δjE)
(
(1− δjδjE)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,WB, F
n
A\j
)
−H
(
Y nj |WB, F
n
A
))
, (2a)
nej ↔
1− δjδjE
δj(1 − δjE)
(
H
(
Y nj |WB, F
n
A
)
− (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
n
A\j , F
i−1
j ,WB
))
, (2b)
nkκ ↔ δκE (1− δκ)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Y
i−1
κ , Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W1,W2, F
n
A\κ
)
, (2c)
nkλ ↔ δλE (1− δλ)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xλi | Y
i−1
λ , F
i−1
λ ,Wλ, F
n
A\λ
)
. (2d)
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(a) Y-network: (δ1, δ1E)=(0.2, 0.05), (δ2, δ2E)=
(0.3, 0.05), (δ3, δ3E)=(0.25, 0.05).
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(b) RY-network: (δ1, δ1E) = (0.1, 0.1),
(δ2, δ2E) = (0.2, 0.05), (δ3, δ3E) = (0.3, 0.15),
D0=0.4.
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(c) X-network: (δ1, δ1E)=(0.1, 0.1), (δ2, δ2E)=
(0.2, 0.05), (δ3, δ3E) = (0.3, 0.15), (δ4, δ4E) =
(0.4, 0.35), (δ5, δ5E)=(0.5, 0.2).
Fig. 2: Numerical evaluations for the three networks in Fig. 1.
quantities in (2) are non-negative (see Appendix B-D for the
details).
Step 3. By using the correspondences in (2), Lemma 4 and
information theoretic properties we derive an outer bound on
the secure capacity (see Appendices B-D for the details). Each
constraint in the LPs in Theorems 1-3 is proved to match an
outer bound.
C. Numerical Evaluations
We here compare the secrecy capacity performance of our
schemes in Theorems 1-3 with respect to two naive strategies,
i.e., the path sharing and the link sharing. In the path sharing
the whole communication resources, at each time instant, are
used only by one session; for example, for the X-network we
have a time-sharing between S1-M1-M2-D1 and S2-M1-M2-
D2. Differently, in the link sharing strategy only the shared
communication link is time-shared among the two unicast
sessions; for example, in the X-network only the M1-M2 link
is time-shared. For both these strategies we do not allow
the source node that does not participate to act as a source
of randomness, e.g., for the X-network the random packets
sent by S1 cannot be used to encrypt the message packets of
S2. Fig. 2 shows the performance (in terms of secrecy capacity
region) of these two time-sharing strategies and of our schemes
in Theorems 1-3. From Fig. 2 we observe that our schemes in
Theorems 1-3 (solid line) achieve higher rates compared to the
two time-sharing strategies. Large rate gains are attained when,
for each channel, the eavesdropper receives almost everything
and the legitimate node receives almost no information. Under
these channel conditions, for the Y-network the individual rates
are double than those achieved by the link-sharing strategy; for
the RY- and X-network the sum-rate is twice than that of the
link-sharing scheme. In general, these gains follow since: (i)
in the Y-network S1 and S2 transmit random packets to M
and these can be mixed to create a key on the shared link;
(ii) in the RY-network the same set of random packets can
be used to generate keys for both the M-D1 and M-D2 links.
These factors decrease the number of random packets required
to be sent from the source(s) and implies that more message
packets can be carried. Finally, (iii) in the X-network we have
the benefits of both the Y- and RY-network.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We characterized the secret capacity for networks where
two unicast sessions share one communication link. This was
attained by designing schemes and by deriving outer bounds
which were formulated as LPs. Through numerical evaluations
we showed that our transmission strategies achieve higher rates
compared to schemes where the communication resources are
time-shared among the two sessions. These results show that,
even in network configurations for which network coding
does not offer benefits in absence of security, it can become
beneficial under security constraints.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We here prove the result in Lemma 4. We start by analyzing
the Y-network. We have, ∀j ∈ A = [1 : 3] and with W3 =
W[1:2],
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,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from the chain rule
of the entropy; (ii) the equality in (b) is due to the defini-
tion of mutual information; (iii) finally, the equality in (c)
is because Fjn is independent of the rest of the random
variables. By recursively proceeding in the same way for
H
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n−1
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n
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j , F
n−1
j
)
, we get the result
in (1a). We now prove (1b) which is similar to (1a).
We have, ∀j ∈ A = [1 : 3] and with W3 =W[1:2],
H
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where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from the chain rule
of the entropy; (ii) the equality in (b) is due to the defini-
tion of mutual information; (iii) finally, the equality in (c)
is because Fjn is independent of the rest of the random
variables. By recursively proceeding in the same way for
H
(
Y n−1j , F
n−1
j |Wj , F
n
A\j , F
n−1
j
)
, we get the result in (1b).
By means of similar steps, it is not difficult to prove the
result in (1a) and (1b) for the RY- and X-network.
We have, ∀j ∈ A = [1 : 3] and with W3 = W[1:2],
ǫ
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,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) is due to the security con-
straints; (ii) the equality in (b) follows from the independence
of Wj on FnA\j ; (iii) the equality in (c) is due to the chain
rule of the mutual information; (iv) finally, the equality in (d)
is due to the independence of Wj on Fji. This proves (1c) for
the Y-network. By means of similar steps, it is not difficult to
prove the result in (1c) for the RY- and X-network.
We then have, ∀j ∈ A = [1 : 3], with W3 = W[1:2] and
R3 = R1 + R2,
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where: (i) the inequality in (a) is due to the Fano’s inequality;
(ii) the inequality in (b) follows from the Markov chain Wj−
Y nj , F
n
A − Y
n
3 for j ∈ [1 : 2]; (iii) the equality in (c) is due
to the chain rule of the mutual information; (iv) the inequality
in (d) is because the mutual information is a non-negative
quantity; (v) the equality in (e) follows from the independence
of Wj and FnA\j ; (vi) the equality in (f) is due to the chain
rule of the mutual information; (vii) finally, the equality in (g)
follows from the independence of Wj on Fji. This proves (1d)
for the Y-network. By means of similar steps, it is not difficult
to prove the result in (1d) for the RY- and X-network.
Finally, for node D in the Y-network we have
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where: (i) the inequality in (a) is due to the Fano’s inequality;
(ii) the equality in (b) follows from the independence of the
pair (W1,W2) on FnA\3; (iii) the equality in (c) is due to the
chain rule of the mutual information; (iv) finally, the equality
in (d) follows from the independence of the pair (W1,W2) on
F3i. This proves (1e) for the Y-network. By means of similar
steps, it is not difficult to prove the results in (1f) and in (1g)
for the RY- and X-network, respectively.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE OF THEOREM 1
For the Y-network, in (2) we set A = [1 : 3], κ = 3 and
λ ∈ [1 : 2]. We use (2c) and (2d) for proving the converse of
Theorem 1. The RHS of these two expressions is positive as
the entropy of a discrete random variable is positive.
First constraint. From (2d) we have
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where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since the entropy of
a discrete random variable is positive; (ii) the equality in (b)
is due to (1a) in Lemma 4; (iii) the equality in (c) is due
to the definition of mutual information; (iv) the equality in
(d) follows from the definition of mutual information; (v)
the inequality in (e) follows from the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle; (vi) the equality in (f) is due to the
definition of mutual information; (vii) finally, the inequality
in (g) follows by means of (1c) and (1d) in Lemma 4.
Second constraint. From (2c) with W[1:2] =W3 , we have
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where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since the entropy of
a discrete random variable is positive; (ii) the equality in (b)
is due to (1a) in Lemma 4; (iii) the equality in (c) is due
to the definition of mutual information; (iv) the equality in
(d) follows from the definition of mutual information; (v)
the inequality in (e) follows from the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle; (vi) the equality in (f) is due to the
definition of mutual information; (vii) finally, the inequality
in (g) follows by means of (1c) and (1d) in Lemma 4 with
R3 = R1 +R2.
Third constraint. From (2d) we get
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where the last equality follows from (1b) in Lemma 4.
Using this and Fano’s inequality with λ ∈ [1 : 2] we have
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where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the Markov
chain Wλ − Y nλ , FnA − Y n3 , ∀λ ∈ [1 : 2]; (ii) the equality
in (b) follows because of the independence between FnA and
Wλ; (iii) the equality in (c) follows from the definition of
mutual information; (iv) finally, the inequality in (d) follows
since node M receives at most n (1− δλ) packets on channel
λ ∈ [1 : 2].
Fourth constraint. From (1e) in Lemma 4 we have
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where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from the definition of
mutual information; (ii) the inequality in (b) is due to the
fact that H (X3i) ≤ 1; (iii) the inequality in (c) is due to the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (iv) finally, the
equality in (d) follows from (2c).
Fifth constraint. From (1b) and (2d) we have
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where: (i) the inequality in (a) is due to the ‘conditioning
reduces the entropy’ principle; (ii) the inequality in (b) follows
since H (X,Y ) ≤ H(X) + H(Y ); (iii) the inequality in
(c) follows since the entropy of a discrete random variable
is a positive quantity; (iv) the equality in (d) is due to the
chain rule of the mutual information; (v) the equality in (e)
follows since node M does not have any randomness and
so X3i is uniquely determined by knowing (Y n1 , Y n2 , FnA);
(vi) the equality in (f) is due to the Markov chain X3i −
W1,W2, F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 −F
n
3i; (vii) finally, the equal-
ity in (g) follows from (2c).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE OF THEOREM 2
For the RY-network, in (2) we set A = [1 : 3], j = 3,
κ ∈ [1 : 2], B = [1 : 2] and e3 = e. We start by proving that the
Righ-Hand Side (RHS) of the quantities in (2) is positive. We
use (2a), (2b) and (2c) for proving the converse of Theorem 2.
The RHS of (2c) is positive as the entropy of a discrete random
variable is positive. For the RHS of (2a), we have
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where: (i) the equality in (a) follows because given F3i, the
pair (Y3i, Z3i) is equal to X3i with probability (1− δ3δ3E)
and null otherwise and because of the Markov chain X3i −
W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 −F
n
3i; (ii) finally, the equality
in (b) is due to the chain rule of entropy.
For the RHS of (2b), we have
H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
− (1− δ3)
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3, F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2]
)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
H
(
Y3i|W[1:2], F
n
A, Y
i−1
3
)
− (1− δ3)
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3, F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2]
)
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
H
(
Y3i|W[1:2], F
n
A, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3
)
− (1− δ3)
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3, F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2]
)
=(1−δ3)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i|W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
3i
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3, F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2]
)]
(c)
= (1− δ3)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i|W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3, F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2]
)]
= 0,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from the chain rule
of the entropy; (ii) the inequality in (b) is due to the
conditioning reduces the entropy principle; (iii) finally, the
equality in (c) follows because of the Markov chain X3i −
W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 − F
n
3i.
First constraints. From (2a) and (2b) we have
nk3 + ne
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
= δ3E (1− δ3)
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2], F
n
A\3
)
(a)
≥ δ3E (1−δ3)
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2], F
n
A\3
)
−H
(
Y n3 | W[1:2], F
n
A, Z
n
3
)
(b)
= (1− δ3E) ·
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y i−13 , F
i−1
3 ;X3i | Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2], F
n
A\3
)
(c)
= (1− δ3E)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2], F
n
A\3
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3
)]
(d)
= (1− δ3E)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
X3i;W[1:2]|Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3
)]
(e)
≥ (1− δ3E)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
X3i;W[1:2]|Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 ,W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3
)]
(f)
= (1− δ3E)
[
n∑
i=1
I
(
X3i;W[1:2] | Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
X3i;W[1:2]|Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
A\3
)]
(g)
≥ n(R1 +R2)
1− δ3E
1− δ3Eδ3
− ǫ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since the entropy of
a discrete random variable is positive; (ii) the equality in (b)
is due to (1a) in Lemma 4; (iii) the equality in (c) is due
to the definition of mutual information; (iv) the equality in
(d) follows from the definition of mutual information; (v)
the inequality in (e) follows from the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle; (vi) the equality in (f) is due to the
definition of mutual information; (vii) finally, the inequality
in (g) follows by means of (1c) and (1d) in Lemma 4.
Second constraints. From (2c) we have
nkκ
= δκE (1−δκ)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Y
i−1
κ , Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], F
n
A\κ
)
(a)
≥ δκE (1−δκ)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Y
i−1
κ , Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], F
n
A\κ
)
−H
(
Y nκ |W[1:2], F
n
A, Z
n
κ
)
(b)
= (1− δκE)
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y i−1κ , F
i−1
κ ;Xκi | Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], F
n
A\κ
)
(c)
= (1− δκE)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], F
n
A\κ
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ
)]
(d)
= (1− δκE)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
A\κ
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xκi;W[1:2]|Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
A\κ
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ
)]
(e)
≥ (1− δκE)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Y
i−1
κ , Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
A\κ
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xκi;W[1:2]|Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
A\κ
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ
)]
(f)
= (1− δκE)
[
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xκi;W[1:2] | Y
i−1
κ , Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
A\κ
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xκi;W[1:2]|Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
A\κ
)]
(g)
≥ nRκ
1− δκE
1− δκEδκ
− ǫ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since the entropy of
a discrete random variable is positive; (ii) the equality in (b)
is due to (1a) in Lemma 4; (iii) the equality in (c) is due
to the definition of mutual information; (iv) the equality in
(d) follows from the definition of mutual information; (v)
the inequality in (e) follows from the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle; (vi) the equality in (f) is due to the
definition of mutual information; (vii) finally, the inequality in
(g) follows by means by means of (1c) and (1d) in Lemma 4.
Third constraint. From (2a) and (2b) we get ne + nk3
δ3E
= H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
. Now, with this and by using Fano’s
inequality (keeping in mind that the messages are independent)
we have
n (R1 +R2) + ne+
nk3
δ3E
≤ I
(
W[1:2];Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 , F
n
A
)
+H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
+ nǫ
(a)
≤ I
(
W[1:2];Y
n
3 , F
n
A
)
+H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
+ nǫ
(b)
= I
(
W[1:2];Y
n
3 | F
n
A
)
+H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
+ nǫ
(c)
= H (Y n3 | F
n
A) + nǫ
(d)
≤ n (1− δ3) + nǫ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the Markov
chain W[1:2]−Y n3 , FnA−Y n1 , Y n2 ; (ii) the equality in (b) follows
because of the independence between FnA and (W1,W2); (iii)
the equality in (c) follows from the definition of mutual
information; (iv) finally, the inequality in (d) follows since
node M receives at most n (1− δ3) packets.
Fourth constraint. From (1f) in Lemma 4 we have
nRκ ≤ (1− δκ)
n∑
i=1
I
(
Wκ;Xκi | F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ
)
(a)
= (1− δκ)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,Wκ
)]
(b)
≤ (1− δκ)n
− (1− δκ)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,Wκ
)
(c)
≤ (1− δκ)n
− (1− δκ)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi | F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ ,W[1:2], Z
i−1
κ
)
(d)
= (1− δκ)n−
kκ
δκE
n,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from the definition of
mutual information; (ii) the inequality in (b) is due to the
fact that H (Xκi) ≤ 1; (iii) the inequality in (c) is due to the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (iv) finally, the
equality in (d) follows from (2c).
Fifth constraint. The node S has a discrete source of random-
ness U0 such that
nD0 = H (U0)
(a)
= H
(
U0 | W[1:2], F
n
A\3
)
(b)
≥ I
(
U0;Y
n
3 , Z
n
3 , F
n
3 | W[1:2], F
n
A\3
)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I
(
U0;Y3i, Z3i, F3i |W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3
)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I
(
U0;Y3i, Z3i | W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F3i
)
= (1− δ3Eδ3) ·
n∑
i=1
I
(
U0;X3i | W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3
)
(e)
= (1−δ3Eδ3)
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i | W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3
)
(f)
=
1− δ3Eδ3
δ3E (1− δ3)
(
nk3 + ne
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
)
=
1− δ3Eδ3
δ3E (1− δ3)
nk3 + ne,
where: (i) the equality in (a) is due to independence of U0
on the rest of the random variables; (ii) the inequality in
(b) follows since the entropy of a discrete random variable
is positive; (iii) the equality in (c) is due to the chain rule
of the mutual information; (iv) the equality in (d) follows
because of the independence between F3i and U0; (v) the
equality in (e) follows because X3i is uniquely determined
given
(
U0,W1,W2, F
i−1
A
)
; (vi) finally, the equality in (f)
follows from (2a) and (2b).
Sixth constraint. From (2a) and (2b) we have
n
(
e+
k3
δ3E
)
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
=
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
(a)
≥
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
I
(
Y n3 ;Z
n
κ , Y
n
κ |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
(b)
=
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y n3 ;Zκi, Yκi|W[1:2], F
n
A, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ
)
=
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
(1− δκEδκ) ·
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y n3 ;Xκi|W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
κi
)
(c)
=
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
(1− δκEδκ) ·
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi|W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
κi
)
(d)
=
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
(1− δκEδκ) ·
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi|W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ
)
(e)
= nkκ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since the entropy
of a discrete random variable is positive; (ii) the equal-
ity in (b) is due to the chain rule of the mutual infor-
mation; (iii) the equality in (c) follows since Xκi (with
κ ∈ [1 : 2]) is uniquely determined given (Y n3 , FnA); (iv)
the equality in (d) follows because of the Markov chain
Xκi −W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ , Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ − F
n
κi; (v) finally, the
equality in (e) follows from (2c).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE OF THEOREM 3
For the X-network, in (2) we set A = [1 : 5], λ ∈ [1 : 2],
j = 3, κ ∈ [4 : 5], B = {j}, W3 = W4 = W5 = W[1:2] and
e3 = e. We start by proving that the Righ-Hand Side (RHS)
of the quantities in (2) is positive. It is straightforward to see
that the RHS of (2c) and (2d) is positive as the entropy of a
discrete random variable is positive. For the RHS of (2a) we
have
(1− δjδjE)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
−H
(
Y nj |Wj , F
n
A
)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
H
(
Yji, Zji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
n
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
−H
(
Y nj |Wj , F
n
A
)
(b)
= H
(
Y nj , Z
n
j | F
n
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
−H
(
Y nj |Wj , F
n
A
)
= H
(
Y nj , Z
n
j | Wj , F
n
A
)
−H
(
Y nj |Wj , F
n
A
)
≥ 0,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows because given Fji,
(Yji, Zji) is equal to Xji with probability (1− δjδjE) and
null otherwise and because of the Markov chain Xji −
Wj , F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j −F
n
ji; (ii) finally, the equality in
(b) is due to the chain rule of entropy.
For the RHS of (2b) we have
H
(
Y nj |Wj , F
n
A
)
− (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
n
A\j , F
i−1
j ,Wj
)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
H
(
Yji|Wj , F
n
A, Y
i−1
j
)
− (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
n
A\j , F
i−1
j ,Wj
)
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
H
(
Yji|Wj , F
n
A, Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j
)
− (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
n
A\j , F
i−1
j ,Wj
)
= (1− δj)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji|Wj , F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
ji
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
n
A\j , F
i−1
j ,Wj
)]
(c)
= (1− δj)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji|Wj , F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
n
A\j , F
i−1
j ,Wj
)]
= 0,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from the chain rule
of the entropy; (ii) the inequality in (b) is due to the
‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (iii) finally, the
equality in (c) follows because of the Markov chain Xji −
Wj , F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j − F
n
ji.
First to third constraints. From (2d), ∀j ∈ [1 : 2]
nkj
= δjE (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
≥ δjE (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
,
where the inequality follows from the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle. From (2c), ∀j ∈ [4 : 5]
nkj
= δjE (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
.
From (2a) and (2b) with j = 3
nkj + nej
(1 − δj)δjE
1− δjδjE
= δjE (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
.
Thus, ∀j ∈ [1 : 5] with R3 = R1 + R2, R4 = R1, R5 = R2
and e1 = e2 = e4 = e5 = 0, we have
nkj + nej
(1− δj)δjE
1− δjδjE
≥ δjE (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
(a)
≥ δjE (1− δj)
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
−H
(
Y nj | Wj , F
n
A, Z
n
j
)
(b)
= (1−δjE)
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y i−1j , F
i−1
j ;Xji | Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
(c)
= (1− δjE)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j
)]
(d)
= (1− δjE)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
A\j
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xji;Wj |Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
A\j
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j
)]
(e)
≥ (1− δjE)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
A\j
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xji;Wj |Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
A\j
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xji | Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j ,Wj , F
n
A\j , Y
i−1
j
)]
(f)
= (1− δjE)
[
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xji;Wj | Y
i−1
j , Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
A\j
)
−
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xji;Wj |Z
i−1
j , F
i−1
j , F
n
A\j
)]
(g)
≥ nRj
1− δjE
1− δjEδj
− ǫ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since the entropy of
a discrete random variable is positive; (ii) the equality in (b)
is due to (1a) in Lemma 4; (iii) the equality in (c) is due
to the definition of mutual information; (iv) the equality in
(d) follows from the definition of mutual information; (v)
the inequality in (e) follows from the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle; (vi) the equality in (f) is due to the
definition of mutual information; (vii) finally, the inequality
in (g) follows by means of (1c) and (1d) in Lemma 4.
Fourth constraint. From (2d) and (1b), we have nkλ
δλE
=
H (Y nλ |Wλ, F
n
A). By using this and Fano’s inequality we have
nRλ +
nkλ
δλE
≤ I
(
Wλ;Y
n
λ+3, F
n
A
)
+H (Y nλ |Wλ, F
n
A)
(a)
≤ I (Wλ;Y
n
3 , F
n
A) +H (Y
n
λ |Wλ, F
n
A) + nǫ
(b)
≤ I (Wλ;Y
n
λ , F
n
A) +H (Y
n
λ |Wλ, F
n
A) + nǫ
(c)
= I (Wλ;Y
n
λ | F
n
A) +H (Y
n
λ |Wλ, F
n
A) + nǫ
(d)
= H (Y nλ | F
n
A) + nǫ
(e)
≤ n (1− δλ) + nǫ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the Markov
chain Wλ − Y n3 , FnA− Y nλ+3; (ii) the inequality in (b) follows
because of the Markov chain Wλ − Y nλ , FnA − Y n3 ; (iii) the
equality in (c) follows because of the independence between
FnA and Wλ; (iv) the equality in (d) follows from the definition
of mutual information; (v) finally, the inequality in (e) follows
since node M1 receives at most n (1− δλ) packets on channel
λ ∈ [1 : 2].
Fifth constraint. By means of (1g) in Lemma 4 we obtain
nRλ
≤ (1− δλ+3)
n∑
i=1
I
(
Wλ;Xλ+3i | F
n
A\λ+3, Y
i−1
λ+3 , F
i−1
λ+3
)
(a)
= (1− δλ+3)
[
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xλ+3i | F
n
A\λ+3, Y
i−1
λ+3 , F
i−1
λ+3
)
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xλ+3i | F
n
A\λ+3, Y
i−1
λ+3 , F
i−1
λ+3,Wλ
)]
(b)
≤ (1− δλ+3) [n
−
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xλ+3i | F
n
A\λ+3, Y
i−1
λ+3 , F
i−1
λ+3,Wλ+3, Z
i−1
λ+3
)]
(c)
= (1− δλ+3)n−
nkλ+3
δλ+3E
,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from the definition
of mutual information; (ii) the inequality in (b) is because
H (Xλ+3i) ≤ 1 and because of the ‘conditioning reduces the
entropy’ principle; (iii) finally, the equality in (c) follows by
using (2c).
Sixth constraint. From (2a) and (2b) we have ne3 + nk3δ3E =
H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
. By using this and Fano’s inequality we
have
n (R1 +R2) + ne3 +
nk3
δ3E
≤ I
(
W[1:2];Y
n
4 , Y
n
5 , F
n
A
)
+H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
+ nǫ
(a)
≤ I
(
W[1:2];Y
n
3 , F
n
A
)
+H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
+ nǫ
(b)
= I
(
W[1:2];Y
n
3 | F
n
A
)
+H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
+ nǫ
(c)
= H (Y n3 | F
n
A) + nǫ
(d)
≤ n (1− δ3) + nǫ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows because of the Markov
chain W1,W2−Y n3 , FnA−Y n4 , Y n5 ; (ii) the equality in (b) fol-
lows because of the independence between FnA and (W1,W2);
(iii) the equality in (c) follows from the definition of mutual
information; (iv) finally, the inequality in (d) follows since
node M2 receives at most n (1− δ3) packets.
Seventh constraint. From (2d) and (1b) we have
n
(
k1
δ1E
+
k2
δ2E
)
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
=
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
[H (Y n1 |W1, F
n
A) +H (Y
n
2 |W2, F
n
A)]
(a)
≥
(1 − δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
[
H
(
Y n1 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
+H
(
Y n2 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)]
(b)
≥
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
H
(
Y n1 , Y
n
2 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
(c)
≥
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
I
(
Y n1 , Y
n
2 ;Z
n
3 , Y
n
3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
(d)
=
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
·
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y n1 , Y
n
2 ;Z3i, Y3i|W[1:2], F
n
A, Z
i−1
3 , Y
i−1
3
)
=
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
(1− δ3Eδ3) ·
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y n1 , Y
n
2 ;X3i|W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Z
i−1
3 , Y
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 , F
n
3i
)
(e)
=
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
(1− δ3Eδ3) ·
n∑
i=1
H
(
X3i|W[1:2], F
n
A\3, Z
i−1
3 , Y
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3
)
(f)
= nk3 + ne3
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) is due to the ‘conditioning
reduces the entropy’ principle; (ii) the inequality in (b) is
because H (A,B) ≤ H (A) + H (B); (iii) the inequality in
(c) follows since the entropy of a discrete random variable is
positive; (iv) the equality in (d) is due to the chain rule of the
mutual information; (v) the equality in (e) follows since X3i is
uniquely determined given (Y n1 , Y n2 , FnA) and because of the
Markov chain X3i −W1,W2, FnA\3, Y
i−1
3 , Z
i−1
3 , F
i−1
3 − F
n
3i;
(vi) finally, the equality in (f) follows from (2a) and (2b).
Eighth constraint. From (2a) and (2b) we have
n
(
e3 +
k3
δ3E
)
(1 − δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
=
(1 − δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
H
(
Y n3 |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
(a)
≥
(1− δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
I
(
Y n3 ;Z
n
κ , Y
n
κ |W[1:2], F
n
A
)
(b)
=
(1−δκ)δκE
1−δκδκE
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y n3 ;Zκi, Yκi|W[1:2], F
n
A, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ
)
=
(1 − δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
(1− δκEδκ) ·
n∑
i=1
I
(
Y n3 ;Xκi|W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
κi
)
(c)
=
(1 − δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
(1− δκEδκ) ·
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi|W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ , F
n
κi
)
(d)
=
(1 − δκ)δκE
1− δκδκE
(1− δκEδκ) ·
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xκi|W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Z
i−1
κ , Y
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ
)
(e)
= nkκ,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows since the entropy
of a discrete random variable is positive; (ii) the equal-
ity in (b) is due to the chain rule of the mutual infor-
mation; (iii) the equality in (c) follows since Xκi (with
κ ∈ [4 : 5]) is uniquely determined given (Y n3 , FnA); (iv)
the equality in (d) follows because of the Markov chain
Xκi −W[1:2], F
n
A\κ, Y
i−1
κ , Z
i−1
κ , F
i−1
κ − F
n
κi; (v) finally, the
equality in (e) follows from (2c).
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